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“China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law” or “China’s Turn 
Against Law”?  
 
Albert H.Y. Chen* 
 
 
In 2002, Professor Randall Peerenboom published a major work on legal 
reforms in post-Mao China, entitled “China’s Long March Toward Rule 
of Law”. In 2011, Professor Carl Minzner published a major article on 
trends of legal development in China in the first decade of the 21st century, 
entitled “China’s Turn Against Law”. Has China really embarked upon a 
“long march toward Rule of Law” since Deng Xiaoping initiated the era 
of “reform and opening” in the late 1970s? If so, has there been a 
regression or retrenchment in Rule of Law developments in China in 
recent years?  
 
These questions cannot be properly addressed without first reflecting on 
what methodology or approach we should adopt in describing and 
assessing legal developments in contemporary China. This paper 
therefore consists of two main parts. Part I engages in methodological 
reflections on the study of contemporary Chinese law as an exercise in 
comparative law, by reviewing and commenting on some relevant 
writings of leading scholars in the field. Part II of the paper then proceeds 
to evaluate the legal reforms in post-Mao China and recent trends in the 
Chinese legal system.   
 
I 
 
Edward Said’s work on “Orientalism” has posed important challenges for 
Western scholars who study societies in the non-Western world. It raises 
the question of whether it is possible for Western scholars to study 
non-Western societies in an objective manner, or a way free of cultural 
bias and prejudice. Orientalism is relevant to the study of comparative 
law. The application of Orientalism to the study of comparative law, 
particularly Chinese law, was considered in detail by Professor Teemu 
Ruskola in an article published in 2003 on “Legal Orientalism”. This 
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article provides a good starting point for our methodological reflections 
on the study of contemporary Chinese law.  
 
Ruskola points out that in Western scholarship, there is often a negative 
perception regarding the existence or practice of law in Chinese history 
and in contemporary China (which implicitly condemns the Chinese as 
uncivilized), and this perception is shaped by what he calls “legal 
orientalism”. Ruskola argues that law is an important element of the 
cultural identity of the West and of its self-understanding. Legal 
orientalism involves projecting onto the Other (in this case China) an 
image of the Other’s legal practice that is opposite to that of the West. 
Thus whereas the West (or the Westerner) is a legal subject and practices 
the Rule of Law, China (or the Chinese) is a “non-legal non-subject”1 
and practices “lawlessness”.2 
 
To use Ruskola’s own words: “Today, many American policy-makers still 
view the Chinese as essentially law-less and unindividuated subjects of 
Oriental Despotism, the latest despot being the Communist Party, rather 
than the imperial state.”3 “Western representations of Chinese law … tell 
us far more about the Western idea, and ideology, of law than they do of 
any equivalent (or even nonequivalent) phenomenon in China.”4 Ruskola 
discusses the “legal construction of the national subject” and emphasizes 
“law as constitutive”: “[L]aw participates in the construction of our social 
worlds and, ultimately, of ourselves.”5 His article “sketches how the 
Euro-American legal subject has imagined its relationship, in various 
historical contexts, to its Oriental counterpart, the Chinese non-legal 
non-subject”,6 and analyzes “how the West has constructed its cultural 
identity against China in terms of law”.7 In his view, this exemplifies 
“Orientalism as a discourse [which] entails the projection onto the 
Oriental Other of various sorts of things that ‘we’ are not.”8 Thus “legal 
subjectivity has constituted a standard for measuring non-Western 
societies’ – here, China’s – civilizational fitness to enter into ‘law’s 
republic.’”9    
 
There is probably no disagreement among scholars that “legal orientalism” 
should be avoided as far as possible in the study of Chinese law or law in 
any non-Western society. The real question is what is the proper approach 
to be adopted in such study, and how not to be influenced by legal 
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orientalism. Here Ruskola recognizes the impossibility of finding “an 
Archimedean point of observation”10 in the study of foreign law. 
Following Gadamer’s hermeneutics, he acknowledges that “all 
understanding is situated”,11 “belonging to a tradition is a condition of 
hermeneutics”,12 and no researcher can ever be completely free of bias or 
prejudice. Prejudice “can only be managed, not eliminated.”13 Hence 
Ruskola proposes an “ethics of Orientalism”14 for the purpose of 
comparative law.    
 
According to such ethics of Orientalism, we may begin our study of the 
foreign object with preconceptions and legal categories derived from our 
own tradition, but they are no more than “a provisional point of 
departure”,15 to be questioned by ourselves in the course of our research 
and to be revised over time. This is how we should encounter and enter 
into relations with the other, and as our understanding deepens and our 
horizons broaden in the course of the encounter, what Gadamer calls a 
“fusion of horizons”16 becomes possible. A corollary of this approach in 
the study of Chinese law is that “whether we articulate our criticisms in 
terms of human rights or some other discourse, we must not proceed to 
condemn China without a hearing.”17 
 
The ethics of orientalism as formulated by Ruskola thus attempt to avoid 
ethnocentrism and to achieve a sympathetic understanding of the other 
society or culture concerned. As applied to the study of foreign law, this 
approach invites the Western researcher to reflect on the Western concept 
of law and other Western legal categories before applying them to 
describe or assess law-related phenomenon in a non-Western society like 
China. In another article, on “Law without law, or is ‘Chinese law’ an 
oxymoron?”, Ruskola points out that in the study of Chinese law, it may 
not be appropriate to define the Rule of Law as the opposite of the Rule 
of Men. “[T]he radical rule-of-law/rule-of-men distinction that 
structures – explicitly or implicitly – so much of our comparative 
understanding of Chinese law is simply not a helpful analytic 
framework.”18  
 
This is because traditional Confucian China believed in the rule of men of 
moral virtues, and contemporary socialist China also believes in the 
importance of great leaders who understand what path China should 
4 
 
take.19 “Insofar as the definition of the rule of law is a negative one – the 
rule of law means ‘not the rule of men’ – this dichotomous understanding 
threatens always to condemn ‘Chinese law’ to the status of an 
oxymoron”,20 and “China will remain banished to indefinite legal 
alterity”.21 Thus Ruskola proposes that “we must deconstruct the radical 
normative contrast between the rule of law and the rule of men, and use 
more modest and definable concepts instead.”22 He also suggests that the 
category of “law” should be better understood as “an unstable mix” of 
rule of law and rule of men.23 “Ultimately, the rule-of-law/rule-of-men 
distinction is too moralistic and too black-and-white to be of analytic 
utility.”24 
 
Ruskola’s critique of the use of a vague and Western-centric notion of the 
Rule of Law in the study of Chinese law is useful in reminding us that the 
notion of the Rule of Law and other concepts in Western jurisprudence 
need to be carefully analysed before being employed in evaluating 
law-related phenomena in traditional and contemporary China. However, 
his idea that law consists of “an unstable mix” of rule of law and rule of 
men does not completely answer the question of what is the rule of law. 
Nor is it an adequate answer to the question of what is the appropriate 
conceptual framework to be used in studying Chinese law from a 
comparative law perspective. This question has been tackled by Professor 
Donald Clarke in “Puzzling observations in Chinese law: When is a 
riddle just a mistake?” (in C. Stephen Hsu (ed), Understanding China’s 
Legal System: Essays in Honour of Jerome A Cohen (2003)), to which we 
now turn.       
 
Clarke’s essay contains thought-provoking reflections on the 
methodology for the study of comparative law and Chinese law. He 
points out that in describing and evaluating law-related phenomena in 
China, some kind of “model or paradigm or ideal type” must be 
presupposed, no matter whether the researcher is conscious of it or not. 
He suggests that the dominant model in Western scholars’ study of 
Chinese law is what he calls the “Ideal Western Legal Order” (IWLO) 
model or approach, which uses an idealized version of the legal order in 
Western society as the standard for the purpose of viewing and assessing 
law-related phenomena in China. The adoption of this model often results 
in observations about deficiencies, dysfunctions and aberrations in the 
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operation of the Chinese legal system. Clarke suggests that alternative 
models can and should be explored that can explain the same phenomena 
not as aberrations but as normal and natural features of the operation of 
the alternative model, and that the development of such alternative 
models can contribute to a better understanding of Chinese law.   
 
As Clarke puts it: “[T]he IWLO approach assigns an end state to the 
Chinese legal system and evaluates it both statically (how far away is it?) 
and dynamically (in which direction is it going?) with reference to this 
end state.”25 He identifies two assumptions behind the IWLO approach:  
 
“The first assumption is that China has legal institutions. In other 
words, the IWLO approach assumes that we can talk meaningfully 
about Chinese law and institutions; that China has a set of institutions 
that can meaningfully be grouped together under a single rubric, and 
that it is meaningful (i.e., it clarifies more than it obscures) to label this 
rubric ‘legal’ – the same word we use to describe a set of institutions in 
our own society. Thus, even to embark on the study of something called 
‘Chinese legal institutions’ involves an a priori assumption that China 
has a set of institutions largely similar to the institutions we call ‘legal’ 
in our society. … More specifically, the very act of naming certain 
institutions involves drawing conclusions about them before the 
investigation has even begun. If we call a certain institution a ‘court,’ 
then we are claiming that this word conveys to the listener a more 
complete and accurate picture of the institution in question than some 
other word.”26 
 
According to Clarke, the IWLO approach involves also a second 
assumption, which is that Chinese legal institutions are “developing”27 in 
the sense of “moving from a more primitive and inferior stage to” become 
something similar to the “ideal Western legal order”.28  
 
What, then, are the alternative models or approaches which would have 
greater explanatory power than the IWLO model, or which would amount 
to “a more internally consistent model of the Chinese legal system that 
does not require the use of imported and possibly misleading 
categories”?29 Here Clarke recognizes that there does not exist any 
“single ‘right’ model”,30 and that even among the Chinese themselves 
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there are struggles taking place regarding what legal model China should 
adopt.31 He also points out that “different models may be appropriate for 
different fields of law, or even for the same field at different times”.32 
Clarke does venture in his article to discuss some possible models that 
might deserve to be considered in the context of several legal domains, 
including contract law, constitutional law, administrative law.  
 
For example, Clarke suggests that one possible way of understanding the 
Chinese constitution is to regard it as a declaration of policies rather than 
as a legally binding document. From this perspective, “violations” of the 
constitution would not be legally significant, and can even be considered 
“normal or insignificant”. As regards the Chinese system in which the 
authority of different state organs to promulgate regulations is not clearly 
defined and conflicts among regulations issued by different bodies often 
exist, Clarke suggests that it is possible that in the Chinese system, what 
is legally significant is which body has the power to enforce rules, rather 
than which body has the power to make rules, and the allocation of 
rule-making power is a political decision rather than a legal question. 
Viewed from this perspective, “it is not a sign of immaturity or 
inadequacy of the system that China has no effective rules governing 
lawmaking competence”.33 
 
Clarke himself recognizes the limitations of these alternative models 
which he puts forward in his essay. In particular, he is aware that some 
Chinese people in the legal field concerned may not themselves accept 
the models which Clarke is proposing, and may actually be pushing for 
Chinese legal institutions to move towards what Clarke calls the ideal 
Western legal order. For example, he points out that “plenty of Chinese 
inside and outside the community of legal specialists are not content with 
a model that denies legal significance to” China’s constitution. “They 
want it to have legal significance and are working to ensure that it 
does.”34 In the context of administrative law, Clarke also recognizes that 
“[t]here are a number of actors in China that are not satisfied with a 
descriptively more accurate model. They want the model contained in the 
IWLO approach, and they want to change the way China operates until 
that model is in fact descriptively quite accurate.”35 
 
The issues raised by Clarke are indeed fundamental issues in the study of 
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Chinese law from a comparative law perspective. Clarke’s major 
contribution in this regard lies in his pointing out that many researchers 
unconsciously adopt the IWLO approach, his describing how the IWLO 
model is used in practice, and his raising the question of whether the 
IWLO model is appropriate in the study of Chinese law and comparative 
law. However, it seems that Clarke is less successful in suggesting viable 
alternative models or paradigms for such study. As he himself recognizes, 
the models which he formulates as examples of alternative models may 
not be acceptable to the Chinese themselves. Although he recognizes this, 
he has not explored why many Chinese are not or would not be happy 
with such alternative models and may actually prefer the IWLO itself as a 
model which the Chinese legal system should aspire to and develop 
towards. Furthermore, the alternative models he proposes may actually be 
inconsistent with the texts of Chinese law itself; he has not investigated 
into the texts of Chinese law and what legal model they presuppose or 
affirm. For example, the Chinese constitution itself claims to be a 
fundamental law that is binding not only on citizens but also on the 
government and political parties. The Law on Legislation enacted by the 
Chinese National People’s Congress actually attempts to delineate the 
scope of the law-making power of various state organs. These 
constitutional and statutory provisions do not sit comfortably with the 
“alternative models” formulated by Clarke.  
 
Another possible problem in Clarke’s critique of the IWLO model is that 
it might actually increase the risk of “legal orientalism”. For example, 
Clarke raises the questions of whether China really has “legal” 
institutions, and whether China really has “courts” and “judges”. He 
suggests that if we do not regard the judicial institutions and personnel in 
China as courts and judges and impose on them the Western conceptions 
of courts and judges, then the question of judicial independence does not 
arise, and it is not an aberration for Chinese “shenpanyuan” (translated as 
adjudicators or judges) not to be independent in their decision-making. 
Clarke writes: 
 
“If we see an oak tree without bark, we would characterize it as 
‘lacking’ bark. We would not so characterize a concrete (or even a 
wooden) telephone pole, although it is equally barkless. To return to the 
Chinese legal system, it is often said that Chinese judges lack judicial 
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independence. The perception of this lack stems from an interpretation 
of the institution of Chinese courts and judges that sees them as 
embryonic courts and judges in ideal Western legal order. If we 
interpreted the institution of Chinese courts and judges in another light 
-- for example, if we saw them as developing into professional 
basketball teams -- we would discern a completely different set of 
shortcomings, such as height and athletic ability.”36 
 
However, these ideas are inconsistent with the self-understanding of the 
Chinese people themselves. The Chinese believe that they have 
law-making institutions, courts and judges, and the Chinese themselves 
consider the Chinese term for courts (fayuan) to be a direct translation of 
and equivalent of the word “court”). There is also a Chinese term (faguan) 
which is a direct translation of the word “judge”. Many members of the 
Chinese legal community and many Chinese citizens believe that the 
question of judicial independence is a real question for contemporary 
China, and believe that they would be better off if courts and judges can 
become more independent. In these circumstances, what is the value of an 
“alternative model” which suggests that there are no real courts or judges 
in China and thus no question of judicial independence in China? Would 
this not fall into the trap of “legal orientalism”?      
 
Let us now turn to yet another approach to the study of Chinese law, 
which is that adopted by Professor Randall Peerenboom. Peerenboom, 
like Clarke, has written extensively on contemporary Chinese law, but for 
our present purposes we will focus on that part of his work which touches 
on methodological issues, particularly his article on “The X-files: Past 
and present portrayals of China’s alien ‘legal system’”. As he points out 
at the beginning of this article, “Chinese legal scholars face a daunting 
challenge simply to obtain and present an accurate view of the legal 
system. But we face an even more daunting challenge in trying to analyze 
and conceptualize such changes.”37 How then should we go about doing 
this?   
 
Peerenboom advocates a balanced approach to the study of contemporary 
Chinese law, instead of overly negative depictions and assessment of the 
Chinese legal system. He attaches considerable weight to the 
self-understanding on the part of the Chinese people, particularly the 
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legal community, regarding what legal developments in contemporary 
China are intended to achieve. Instead of privileging elements of Chinese 
tradition, culture or philosophy that seem to be inconsistent with the 
concept of the Rule of Law, Peereenboom emphasizes economic, political 
and social factors that are relevant to Chinese legal developments, as well 
as the forces at work in the globalized world today that would lead to 
convergence among legal systems of different countries. He rejects the 
view that China does not have a real “legal system”, and argues that 
China is clearly moving toward the Rule of Law in the “thin” sense.  
 
Peerenboom points out that there is “a tendency in much foreign 
scholarship to portray China’s legal system in excessively negative terms 
and to unduly dismiss developments and trends suggesting that China is 
moving toward some form of rule of law.”38 “[T]he biggest problem was 
the assumption, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, that a 
socialist system that rejected liberal democracy could not be serious about 
legal reforms and rule of law.”39 In response, Peerenboom makes “a plea 
for moderation”40 and “suggest[s] that what is needed is a more balanced 
approach, informed by a broader historical and comparative 
perspective.”41 It is “preferable to at least attempt to present an impartial 
and even-handed account of reforms rather than simply seizing whatever 
explanation would put the legal system and the ruling regime in the worst 
light.”42 Peerenboom also cautions against “exaggerat[ing] the 
differences between legal systems and … mak[ing] a system appear more 
alien and dysfunctional than it is, particularly with respect to the 
contemporary system.”43  
 
As regards the question raised by leading scholars of Chinese law such as 
Stanley Lubman and Donald Clarke regarding whether China today really 
has a “system” that deserves to be called a “legal” system, Peerenboom 
disagrees with Clarke’s suggestion that there can be “alternative models” 
to describe, understand and evaluate law-related phenomena in China. 
“One of the problems in heeding Clarke’s warning about relying on rule 
of law as a benchmark is that there is no other credible theory that better 
describes the current system.”44 “In the absence of a better theoretical 
framework to describe China’s contemporary system than as a legal 
system, … the better approach would seem to be to describe what exists 
in China today as a legal system.”45  
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The main conceptual apparatus used by Peerenboom to study the legal 
system in contemporary China is what he calls the “thin” theory or the 
“thin” conception of the Rule of Law, as distinguished from “thick” 
conceptions of the Rule of Law. The thin conception emphasizes the 
formal characteristics and procedural aspects of the existence and 
operation of laws and legal institutions, while thick conceptions of the 
Rule of Law link the law to particular forms of economic, social and 
political systems. For example, the dominant thick conception of the Rule 
of Law in the Western world today is the liberal democratic version of the 
Rule of Law, which sees the recognition and protection of civil liberties, 
human rights (particularly civil and political rights) and fundamental 
freedoms as an essential ingredient of the Rule of Law. 
 
Peerenboom explains the thin conception of the Rule of Law as follows. 
 
“[A] thin theory stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of 
law – those features that any legal system allegedly must possess to 
function effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the legal 
system is part of a democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or 
socialist, liberal or theocratic. Although proponents of thin 
interpretations of rule of law define it in slightly different ways, there is 
considerable common ground, with many building on or modifying 
Lon Fuller’s influential account that laws be general, public, 
prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and 
enforced.”46 
 
Apart from distinguishing between thin and thick conceptions of the Rule 
of Law, Peerenboom also recognizes the distinction between Rule by Law 
and Rule of Law: “Legal systems in which the law is only or primarily a 
tool of the state are best described as rule by law, whereas legal systems 
in which the law imposes meaningful limits on state actors merit the label 
rule of law.”47  
 
The next question is whether the state of the legal system in 
contemporary China satisfies the requirements of at least the thin theory 
of the Rule of Law. Peerenboom writes: “China seems to be moving 
toward some form of rule of law, but not the liberal democratic form of 
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rule of law”.48 “There have been continuous attempts at major legal 
reform for the last twenty years, with many reforms being modeled on 
Western laws and institutional arrangements. … But … shortcomings [in 
the Chinese legal system] are to be expected. Establishing a modern rule 
of law system takes time – several centuries in the case of European 
countries. The government is aware of the many problems in the legal 
system and is taking steps to address them.”49 
 
Apart from relying on his own assessment of legal developments in 
post-Mao China, Peerenboom also refers to the state of the debate in 
China itself about the direction of legal development. He notes that 
although “there is considerable debate about competing thick conceptions 
of rule of law” (in which what Peerenboom calls “liberal democratic”, 
“statist socialist”, “neo-authoritarian” and “communitarian” schools of 
thought contend against one another),50 there seems to be a consensus 
among the Chinese that a “thin” Rule of Law is good for China, is what 
China needs and is what legal reforms should try to achieve. It is 
generally accepted that China should build a legal system that satisfies 
the requirements of the thin conception of the Rule of Law, or “a system 
in which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and 
individual members of the ruling elite, as captured in the rhetorically 
powerful if overly simplistic notions of a government of laws, the 
supremacy of the law, and equality of all before the law.”51 
  
Peerenboom’s call for a balanced approach to the study of legal 
developments in contemporary China that takes into account historical 
and comparative dimensions and the self-understanding of the Chinese 
people regarding what they are doing deserves to be supported. It steers 
clear of legal orientalism, which tends to dismiss the idea that China has a 
genuine legal system or is practicing or moving toward the Rule of Law 
either on the ground that the Rule of Law is absent in the Chinese cultural 
tradition or on the ground that China is ruled by the Chinese Communist 
Party. The distinction drawn by Peerenboom between thin and thick 
conceptions of the Rule of Law is useful particularly for the purpose of 
studying legal reform in an authoritarian regime like China’s. 
Peerenboom is correct in pointing out that if the liberal democratic 
conception of the Rule of Law – as a thick conception of the Rule of 
Law – were to be applied to assess the state of Chinese law and the 
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Chinese legal system, it would inevitably produce an overly negative 
assessment, and ignore the genuine progress that has been made in the 
development of laws and legal institutions in post-Mao China. A 
sympathetic understanding of what the Chinese people have been doing 
in reconstructing their legal system after the leftist excesses of Maoist 
rule and the terror of the Cultural Revolution era can and should take as 
its point of departure the thin theory of the Rule of Law.  
 
Peerenboom’s study of Chinese legal reform hinges not only on the 
distinction between the thin and thick conceptions of the Rule of Law, but 
also the distinction between Rule of Law and Rule by Law. Peerenboom 
recognizes that Rule of Law, unlike Rule by Law as an instrument of the 
state or party-state, requires the power of rulers to be subject to 
meaningful restraint. One of his main theses is that contemporary China 
is moving towards Rule of Law in the thin sense, while his adversaries 
would argue that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is practicing, 
intends to continue to practice, and is only capable of practicing Rule by 
Law, and that the CCP has no intention of subjecting itself to law, or to 
allow the development of legal and judicial institutions strong enough to 
challenge the supremacy of and monopoly of power by the CCP.  
Peerenboom’s work does not close, but only opens, the debate on these 
questions.     
 
II 
 
The trajectory of legal reform in post-Mao China has been well 
documented. Putting aside the debate about whether China is moving 
towards the Rule of Law or only Rule by Law, there is no doubt that  
China has moved from a state with hardly any law (as of the end of the 
Cultural Revolution era in 1976) to a state in which, as was officially 
declared in 2011, a “socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics” 
has been established, and a state with sizeable legal institutions, including 
law-making authorities and courts at national, provincial and local levels, 
large numbers of judges, procurators, lawyers, legal aid workers, law 
schools, government organs charged with promoting legal knowledge 
among members of the public, etc. It is not possible in this essay to cite 
the huge amount of evidence for what Peerenboom calls “China’s Long 
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March Toward Rule of Law”. It may suffice to cite the conclusions 
reached by several leading scholars of contemporary Chinese law.  
 
In Professor William Alford’s view, “The People’s Republic of China’s 
(PRC) post-Cultural Revolution project of legal development is an event 
of epic historic proportions. No other major modern society has 
endeavored in so short a time to reconstruct its legal system in so 
extensive and novel a fashion.”52 In a similar vein, Professor Benjamin 
Liebman writes: “Over the past thirty years China has engaged in what is 
perhaps the most rapid development of any legal system in the history of 
the world.”53 Even Professor Stanley Lubman, who published in 1999 his 
book on “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao”, in which he 
suggests that “China does not have a legal system” (emphasis in 
original)54 and describes himself as “a cautious pessimist about the future 
of legality in China”,55 acknowledges in the same book as follows: 
 
“The accomplishments of the legal reform to date are impressive given 
the need to overcome the burden of Chinese tradition, thirty years of 
Maoism, and the hostility of the institutional environment in which 
reform must take place. Law has gained more importance than it has 
ever possessed in Chinese history. China’s emergent legal institutions 
have begun to define and protect expectations arising out of economic 
transactions among Chinese citizens, to settle an increasing number of 
disputes among them, and to generate new conceptions of legal 
rights.”56  
 
Given that post-Mao China has indeed made significant progress in the 
development of its legal system and there has indeed been an attempt to 
move towards at least the thin form of the Rule of Law as suggested by 
Peerenboom, the next question to be tackled is whether there has been in 
recent years a “turn against law” as suggested by Minzner’s article 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper. The remainder of this paper will 
examine Minzner’s thesis and explore whether there has been 
retrogression or retrenchment in Chinese legal developments in recent 
years.  
 
Minzner’s main thesis is that in the first decade of the 21st century, the 
Chinese party-state changed the direction of, or turned away from, the 
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legal reforms it introduced in the last two decades of the 20th century 
because of concerns about social stability and in response to the rising 
numbers of petitions and protests by citizens with various kinds of 
grievances, including dissatisfaction with courts’ decisions. Instead of 
emphasizing adjudication of civil cases in accordance with legal norms, 
the new policy has been to encourage mediation by courts (in addition to 
extra-judicial mediation or mediation by people’s mediation committees 
and “big mediation” efforts coordinated by government bodies), and to 
require courts to make decisions that are acceptable to the litigants and 
public opinion and that minimize social discontent, even if such 
mediation effort and judicial decision-making involves departure from 
what legal norms require. In Minzner’s view, this new policy or trend can 
be regarded as the party-state’s “politicized rejection”57 of many of the 
legal reforms it introduced in the last two decades of the 20th century, and 
amounts to what Minzner calls a “turn against law”. It has adverse 
implications for the long-term development of the Chinese legal system 
and also for social stability in the long term. 
 
Minzner also tries to situate this trend in China in the context of what he 
perceives as a worldwide trend to promote alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), including developments in developing countries which have 
imported Western legal models of legality and subsequently found that 
they are not so suitable to their indigenous circumstances after all. There 
is indeed “a global reconsideration of legal norms and institutions 
imported or transplanted from the West.”58 However, Minzner argues that 
the “turn against law” in China can be distinguished from apparently 
similar cases elsewhere because in the case of China, the phenomenon is 
“a top-down authoritarian response motivated by social stability 
concerns”.59  
 
In his article, Minzner also mentions other recent phenomena in the 
Chinese legal system, including the crackdown on activist lawyers, the 
campaign to promote “socialist” rule of law, the strengthening of political 
control on judges and lawyers, and the promotion of the doctrine of the 
“Three Supremes” in the context of legal and judicial work (the 
supremacy of the CCP’s cause, the supremacy of the interests of the 
people, and the supremacy of the Constitution and the law). However, 
Minzner has not discussed or analyzed these developments in detail in his 
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article which, as he points out in the introductory section of the article, 
focuses on the “Chinese judiciary’s treatment of civil and administrative 
grievances – the centerpiece of earlier legal and court reform efforts”.60  
 
Despite his generally negative assessment of recent trends in the Chinese 
legal system, Minzner has taken care not to be too one-sided in his 
account. Thus he enters the “caveats” that “[l]aw has not been abandoned 
in China”; law-making still goes on, and “[c]itizens and corporations 
continue to invoke legal norms as they seek to protect their interests. 
There is still some (albeit reduced) room for progressive institutional 
reform in China under the ‘rule of law’ rubric.”61 He also acknowledges 
that the results of the emphasis on mediation are “not entirely negative”,62 
and “some reforms may be positive.”63 And he recognizes that “[m]any 
of the critiques of the 1990s-era legal reforms have merit. Excessive 
reliance on imported legal norms and institutions may not respond fully 
to the needs of rural China.”64 
 
Finally, Minzner in his article investigates into the means by which the 
Chinese authorities have implemented the party-state’s new policy 
towards dispute resolution, including the propaganda campaigns to 
promote certain “model judges”,65 and the “target responsibility 
system”66 and performance incentives used by the leadership to 
encourage judges to conclude more cases by mediation and to minimize 
decisions that result in petitions and protests. As regards future 
scholarship on Chinese law, he suggests that “[s]cholars too, may need to 
‘turn away from law’ in their studies. If they want to understand how the 
Chinese state operates, they may need to directly incorporate the study of 
Party propaganda and bureaucratic personnel tools in their research.”67   
 
Minzner’s thesis about “China’s turn against law” rests mainly on two 
policies or practices that became emphasized in the domain of civil 
dispute resolution in the first decade of the 21st century – the emphasis (or 
“re-emphasis”) on mediation, including mediation conducted by judges 
after litigation has been initiated (for the purpose of reaching a settlement 
that is acceptable to the parties concerned), and the emphasis (or 
“re-emphasis”) on judicial decision-making that is consistent with public 
opinion and that minimizes dissatisfaction and grievances on the part of 
litigants. Both practices are designed to avoid protests and petitions to 
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higher authorities (particularly through the “letters and visits” (xinfang) 
system), and to promote social stability or the “harmonious society” 
advocated by the CCP.  
 
As Minzner well recognizes and as well researched by other scholars, 
both the practice of mediation and the populist inclination in the 
administration of justice are not new, but have firm roots in the 
revolutionary ideology and practices of the CCP that dated back to 
decades before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. In the case of mediation as a means of dispute settlement, it is 
well-known that it was positively regarded even in traditional China, 
before the advent of communism, where Confucian thinking viewed 
litigation in a negative light. The Chinese communists developed the 
system of people’s mediation committees and considered mediation an 
important part of the Party’s political work among the people, particularly 
in educating them about Party policies. There was also in the CCP’s 
history a long tradition of the “mass line”, a policy designed to bring the 
Party close to the people and to win popular support for the Party. 
Populism in the administration of justice is therefore nothing new. 
 
Faced with rising numbers of petitions and protests in the first decade of 
the 21st century, the Party became increasingly concerned about social 
stability and the survival of the regime itself. The revival of mediation as 
a means of dispute settlement (after many years during which, as pointed 
out by Minzner, the proportion of civil cases settled by mediation has 
continued to drop) and the re-emphasis of aspects of the “mass line” in 
the administration of justice are evidently attempts by the party-state to 
draw on the traditional experience and resources of the CCP for the 
purpose of facing and resolving new problems. This “swing” of emphasis 
from adjudication to mediation in civil dispute settlement and from 
professionalism to populism in the administration of justice is not 
necessarily a “rejection” or repudiation of post-Mao legal reforms in 
constructing a credible legal system. It may also be interpreted as a 
moderate policy adjustment in response to changing social circumstances. 
After all, the legal system that has been constructed remains alive and 
well. The Chinese legal system still retains both elements of adjudication 
and mediation, and both elements of professionalism and populism. 
Indeed, the number of cases litigated before the courts has continued to 
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rise in recent years, and the average educational standards of judges have 
also risen to an unprecedented level. These is nothing sinister or 
unhealthy in the balance between adjudication and mediation or between 
professionalism and populism changing from to time as social 
circumstances change. It is true that the policy has swung in the direction 
of mediation and populism in recent years, but it may well swing again in 
the direction of adjudication and professionalism some time in the future 
if different sociopolitical forces come into play.   
 
On a more philosophical level, it may also be pointed out that the tension 
between adjudication and mediation, and that between professionalism 
and populism, exist in every modern legal system. It is true that mediation 
may not result in outcomes that converge with adjudication strictly in 
accordance with legal rules. However, there do exist circumstances in 
which a mediated settlement acceptable and accepted by the parties is 
preferable, from the point of view of justice and humanity, to the strict 
application of legal rules in a judicial decision that is imposed on the 
parties. Most of the civil cases upon which mediation efforts focus are 
simple disputes among individuals in matters such as family, debt, 
housing or employment. Can it be fairly said that active promotion of 
mediation in such cases is detrimental to the legal system or inconsistent 
with the Rule of Law?   
 
As regards professionalism versus populism in the administration of 
justice, it is by no means clear as a matter of legal philosophy or the Rule 
of Law that populism is bad and professionalism good. Whereas trial by 
public opinion or the media is definitely questionable, there is nothing 
wrong in expecting that the operation of the legal system should result in 
outcomes that, by and large, are consistent with the people’s sense of 
fairness and justice. If, within a particular legal system, judicial decisions 
made by highly educated and professionally trained elite are often 
perceived as unjust and unreasonable by many members of the public, 
this will reflect a significant gap in that system between the law as made, 
interpreted and applied by the legal elite and the people for whom and on 
behalf of whom the law is made and administered. Surely, the Rule of 
Law should not be narrowly interpreted to mean the strict application of 
legal rules in producing outcomes that are contrary to popular perceptions 
of justice.  
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In the light of these reflections, the practices of mediation and populist 
influence on judicial behaviour documented in Minzner’s article do not 
justify the assessment that there has been in China a “turn against law” or 
a turn against the Rule of Law in the first decade of the 21st century. 
Furthermore, if we adopt a broader perspective of the overall 
developments in Chinese law and legal institutions in this decade, 
including the last few years, we will see that China has continued in the 
first decade of the century and the last few years the “long march toward 
rule of law” (in Peerenboom’s words) that it embarked upon since the late 
1970s. Given space limitations, it would not be possible in this paper to 
discuss all the details of these developments. Selected examples to 
illustrate the point will be given below.   
 
On the legislative level, it should be noted that some of the fundamental 
components of the Chinese legal system were enacted in the first decade 
of the century and in the last few years. They include, in the area of civil, 
commercial and economic law, the Law of Property (2007), the Law of 
Tort (2009), the Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Law 
Relationships (2010), the Anti-monopoly Law (2007), the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law (2006), and the Law on Enterprises’ State-owned Assets 
(2008). Major enactments in the same period in the domain of public law 
include the constitutional amendment of 2004 (which, inter alia, 
introduced into the Constitution express provisions on human rights and 
private property rights), the amendment in 2010 of the Electoral Law of 
the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses, the 
amendment in 2010 of the Law on Deputies to National People’s 
Congress and Local People’s Congresses, the Law on Supervision by 
Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at Various Levels (2006), 
the Law on Civil Servants (2005), the amendment in 2010 of the State 
Compensation Law, the Law of Administrative Licensing (2003) and the 
Law of Administrative Coercion (2011). The two latter laws are 
particularly significant from the perspective of the Rule of Law 
understood as legal restraint on the exercise of state power, as these two 
laws limit the scope of the power of administrative organs, regulate the 
exercise of their power and discretion, and introduce principles of due 
process. The enactment by the State Council of the Regulations on 
Openness of Government Information (2007) was also a milestone in the 
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codification of the right to access of government information in China. 
These regulations have given rise to administrative litigation (suits 
against government organs) to enforce the right, which has been further 
elaborated in the latest “Provisions on Several Questions regarding the 
Adjudication of Administrative Law Cases on Openness of Government 
Information” (2011), which is a “judicial interpretation” document 
promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court.  
 
Regarding the role of law in public administration, a significant 
development in the first decade of the century was the promulgation by 
the State Council in 2004 of a detailed and elaborate “Implementation 
Outline for the Comprehensive Promotion of Administration in 
Accordance with Law”. The document sets a 10-year timetable for 
achieving the target of a “government based on the rule of law” (fazhi 
zhengfu). Earlier, the concept of “administration in accordance with law” 
(yifa xingzheng) had already been codified in the State Council’s Decision 
on the Comprehensive Promotion of Administration in Accordance with 
Law (1999), which was made soon after the constitutional amendment of 
March 1999 which introduced into China’s Constitution a provision on 
“ruling the State in accordance with law” and “building a socialist 
Rechtsstaat (Rule of Law state)”. Following the promulgation of the 
Implementation Outline of 2004, the State Council in 2010 promulgated 
an “Opinion on Strengthening the Construction of Rule of Law 
Government”, which sets out eight sets of tasks relating to this project.68 
Some municipal governments (e.g. Beijing, Yuhang, Shenzhen, etc) have 
engaged in the project of designing an index or a set of indicators for 
evaluating their degree of success in practicing administration in 
accordance with law. There have also been experiments to enhance the 
Rule of Law at provincial level. For example, Hunan province introduced 
a project on “Rule of Law in Hunan” (fazhi hunan), and enacted (in the 
absence of national laws on the subjects) as provisional-level legal norms 
its own Provisions on Administrative Procedure (2008) and Measures on 
the Control of Administrative Discretion (2011).69     
 
One of the significant features of law-making in China in the second half 
of the first decade of the 21st century is the increasing attention paid to the 
domain of labour law and social security law, as distinguished from the 
domains of civil, commercial, economic, intellectual property and 
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criminal law that have previously been the foci of legislative efforts. 
Relevant recent enactments in this area of what has officially been termed 
“social law” include the Law of Labour Contracts (2007), the Law on the 
Promotion of Employment (2007), the Law on the Mediation and 
Arbitration of Labour Disputes (2007), and the Social Insurance Law 
(2010). 
 
In the last three years, significant legislative reforms have been 
introduced in the domains of criminal law, criminal procedure and civil 
procedure. For example, in 2010, the 8th amendment to the Criminal Code 
(1997) was enacted. The amendment is well-known for reducing the 
number of capital offences by 19% (the death penalty for 13 non-violent 
economic crimes was abolished), and for its express provisions for lenient 
treatment of juvenile and elderly offenders. The extensive revision of the 
Criminal Procedure Law in 2012, inter alia, provided expressly for human 
rights protection, extended the rights of defence lawyers and of 
defendants, and introduced for the first time the principle of exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence (extracting confessions by torture had already 
been criminalized under the pre-existing law). The extensive revision of 
the Civil Procedure Law in 2012, inter alia, provided for the coordination 
between mediation and litigation, adopted a simplified or summary 
procedure for dealing with small claims, and for the first time provided a 
legal basis for social organizations initiating public interest litigation in 
matters such as environmental and consumer protection.   
 
At the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 
2011, it was announced that the goal set by the 15th National Congress of 
the CCP in 1997 of forming a “socialist system of laws with Chinese 
characteristics” by 2010 had now been achieved. Speaking to the 
Congress, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, 
pointed out that the economic and other achievements made by China so 
far “cannot be separated from the protection offered by the legal system; 
neither can the better future that we are striving to create be separated 
from the protection offered by the legal system. The formation of a 
socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics brings our nation’s 
developments in various domains within a legalized path.” Now that the 
system of laws has been formed, the more pressing tasks (apart from 
continuing legislative work) are, Wu explained, to defend the authority 
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and dignity of the Constitution and the law, to insist on administration in 
accordance with law (including the construction of a Rule of Law 
government (fazhi zhengfu)) and fair administration of justice, and to 
promote legal consciousness and the concept of Rule of Law among all 
members of society, including leaders, cadres and officials.      
 
In October 2011, the State Council’s Information Office published a 
White Paper to publicize China’s achievements in forming its socialist 
system of laws (alternatively translated as “legal system” – the Chinese 
original is falü tixi). The White Paper explains that the socialist system of 
laws with Chinese characteristics is based on the Constitution, and 
consists of laws at its main body and administrative regulations and local 
regulations as its important components; it is an organic unity of various 
areas of the law, including constitutional law, civil and commercial law, 
administrative law, economic law, social law, criminal law, and the law on 
litigation and non-contentious procedures. The White Paper points out 
that as of August 2011, China has enacted, in addition to its Constitution, 
240 laws (counting only those that are currently in force), 706 sets of 
administrative regulations, and more than 8,600 sets of local regulations.  
 
We now turn from the domain of legislation to the judicial domain, in 
which significant developments have also occurred in the first decade of 
the century and in recent years. The topic of “judicial reform” was 
discussed in the CCP General Secretary’s report at each National 
Congress of the CCP since the 15th Congress in 1997. Five-year Reform 
Plans for the Chinese judiciary were published by the Supreme People’s 
Court in 1999, 2005 and 2009.70 In 2003, the CCP established a “Leading 
Group on Judicial Reform”, which made major decisions in 2004, 2006 
and 2008 on various aspects of judicial reform.71 For example, the 2008 
decision reformed the existing system for the funding of Chinese courts, 
regulating the funding to be provided by the central, provincial and local 
governments and increasing the level of central funding for courts in the 
poorer regions of the country.72 
 
In the course of the first decade of the century, various other initiatives 
were introduced for the purpose of improving the Chinese court system. 
In 2002, the unified national examination for all intending lawyers, 
judges and procurators was introduced, to be held annually.73 As a result 
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of this reform and other related efforts, the average educational standards 
of Chinese judges have improved considerably in the course of the 
decade. In 2004, the existing system of popular participation in the 
administration of justice – the “people’s assessors” system in which 
ordinary citizens sit together with professional judges in a collegiate 
bench – was strengthened by the Decision on the Improvement of the 
System of People’s Assessors enacted by the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee.74 Since 2007, all death sentences imposed by lower 
courts in criminal cases have to be approved by the Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC). This reform not only resulted in capital cases to be 
scrutinized more rigorously than before, but also resulted in the 
significant expansion of the SPC in terms of its number of judges.75 
Efforts were made to promote public trials and the publicity and 
transparency of the work of the courts. For instance, the SPC 
promulgated “Several Opinions on the Strengthening of the Work of 
Open Adjudication by the People’s Courts” in 2007, “Six Provisions on 
Open Justice” in 2009, and the “Standards for Courts that are Exemplars 
of Open Justice” in 2010.76  
 
To further regulate the behaviour and professional ethics of judges, the 
SPC promulgated in 2010 revised versions of the “Basic Norms of 
Professional Ethics of Judges” and the “Norms of Behaviour for 
Judges”.77 As a starting point for the establishment of a system of 
judicial precedents and case law, the SPC promulgated in 2010 the 
“Provisions on the Work of Cases for Guidance”, which provide for the 
selection, compilation and publication of “guiding cases” which lower 
courts should refer to when they try similar cases.78 The Law of Civil 
Procedure as amended in 2012 contains provisions requiring court 
judgments to explain the reasons for the judicial decisions79 and 
requiring judgments to be made available to the public, with the 
exception of cases involving trade secrets, national security or the privacy 
of individuals.80     
 
The SPC’s report to the NPC in March 2009 stated that in the period 
1978-2008, the caseload of the Chinese courts had increased 20 times. 
Between 2005-2009, the annual number of cases handled by the courts 
increased by 5.95% per year on the average.81 Figures released since 
2009 show that the number of cases litigated before the courts has 
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continued to increase. The total numbers of cases (including criminal, 
civil, commercial, and administrative law cases) accepted by the courts 
(excluding the SPC itself) for handling were 11.37 million in 2009 
(representing a 6.3% increase compared with 2008); 11.7 million in 2010 
(2.8% increase from previous year); and 12.2 million in 2011 (4.4% from 
previous year). According to the SPC’s annual reports to the NPC, the 
proportion of civil cases (including commercial cases) settled by 
mediation and withdrawal of suits was 62% in 2009 and 65% in 2010, 
and the proportion of civil cases (excluding commercial cases) settled by 
mediation and withdrawal of suits was 67% in 2011.  
 
Apart from the steady increase in the number of cases that went before 
the courts, the first decade of the century has also witnessed spectacular 
expansion in the legal aid system and in the numbers of lawyers, law 
schools and law students in China. The figures below are noteworthy: 
 
Funding for legal aid (in RMB) (M means million)82 
 
2002 (year) 78M 
2003    152M 
2004    217M 
2006    370M 
2011   1,280M  
(According to the White Paper on “Judicial Reform in China” published 
in October 2012, the annual funding for legal aid has on the average 
increased by 26.8% per year since 2009.) 
 
Number of lawyers83 
 
2003 (year)  120,000 
2008   140,000 
2011       215,000  
(Among these 215,000 lawyers, 89.6% are full-time lawyers working in 
law firms; 4.5% are part-time lawyers; 5.9% are lawyers working in 
corporations, government organs, legal aid offices and the army.)  
 
As reported in White Paper on “Judicial Reform in China” (2012), the 
number of litigated cases handled by lawyers in 2011 was 2.315 million, 
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representing a 17.7% increase from the number in 2008; the number of 
items of non-contentious matters handled by lawyers in 2011 was 
625,000, a 17% increase from the number in 2008. Commenting in 2008 
on Chinese legal developments at a conference to celebrate the 30th 
anniversary of “reform and opening” in China, Professor Benjamin 
Liebman remarked that China now had “the third largest number of 
lawyers in the world”.84 
 
In the first decade of the 21st century, legal education at the undergraduate 
and postgraduate levels has also witnessed a tremendous expansion, 
which was partly a result of the government policy to increase vastly the 
number of student places in university education, which resulted in the 
percentage of young people in the relevant age group who were able to 
receive college education to increase from 9.8% in 1998 to 22% in 
2007.85 According to figures in 2008, there were 634 law schools in 
China with a student population of 400,000, with an annual 
undergraduate intake of 100,000 law students.86  
 
Both Chinese government publications and scholarly literature published 
in China and the West point out that the development of the Chinese legal 
system and successive government campaigns to popularize legal 
knowledge among members of the public have resulted in increasing 
levels of legal consciousness and awareness of rights among the Chinese 
people. As the data above indicates, increasing numbers of Chinese 
citizens are taking their cases to courts. Although the high expectations 
generated by the official promotion of legal consciousness have led to 
disillusionment in some cases where litigants had negative experience 
when they came into close contact with China’s judicial institutions, it has 
also been reported that some citizens felt empowered by their knowledge 
and use of the language of law and rights, and by the opportunities to 
have their day in court.  
 
Apart from the context of litigation and courtrooms, the discourse of law 
and rights which the party-state has not only permitted to grow but also 
contributed much to promote has also changed the mentality and attitudes 
of countless Chinese citizens who have various kinds of grievances or 
suffer from various forms of injustice. Scholars, activists and ordinary 
people have sought to rely on the provisions of, and the rights enshrined 
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in, China’s constitution and laws in voicing their grievances, criticizing 
injustice, campaigning for change and even in enacting public acts of 
resistance and protests. Thus, one of the consequences, whether intended 
or not, of the creation of the “socialist system of laws with Chinese 
characteristics” and the development of legal and judicial institutions in 
the PRC is that the world is no longer the same for many Chinese citizens. 
A brave new world has been born in which the language and discourse of 
and thinking about constitutionality, legality, rights and legal justice 
become available to countless citizens as vehicles for enlightenment, 
empowerment, resistance against injustice and oppression, and struggles 
for a better world.    
 
 
  
